Science and the Law Symposium: Introduction by Cavers, David F.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 63 Issue 8 
1965 
Science and the Law Symposium: Introduction 
David F. Cavers 
Harvard University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Science and Technology 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David F. Cavers, Science and the Law Symposium: Introduction, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1325 (1965). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol63/iss8/21 
 
This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
SCIENCE AND THE LAW 
SYMPOSIUM 
INTRODUCTION 
David F. Cavers* 
I 
T HIS symposium reflects a growing concern that, in a period when our society is being rapidly transformed by science and 
technology, increasing attention be directed to the bearing of this 
development on law as our society's primary control system. More-
over, since law can exert some influence on the rate and direction 
of scientific and technological change, the examination must extend 
as well to the bearing of law on the processes of that change. 
In its organization, the symposium also reflects a problem that I 
suspect has perplexed everyone who has sought to embark upon such 
an examination. The points of contact between these two systems-
the legal and the scientific-are so many and so diverse that it is 
hard to find unifying themes to guide the inquiry. The difficulty is 
a real one even when one rigorously excludes the social sciences 
from the array of sciences to be considered. It is not surprising 
therefore that the present symposium, which has drawn the social 
sciences within its ambit, is characterized more by diversity than by 
unity. 
I have recently had the responsibility of attempting in an intro-
ductory paper presented to a conference on "Law and the Social 
Role of Science"1 to identify and comment briefly on what I called 
some "points of confrontation" between "law" and "science," using 
the latter terms to embrace, as the context required, not only the 
respective bodies of learning but also the methods by which they are 
ascertained and applied and the persons engaging in those activities.2 
My undertaking led to the composition of a list of arenas of con-
frontation which, although not all-inclusive, may now serve, with 
some emendations, as a framework to which the contributions to the 
• Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard University.-Ed. 
I. Held at the Rockefeller Institute, New York City, April 8-9, 1965, under the 
auspices of the Institute and the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law. The 
proceedings will be published. 
2. I shall usually adhere to this convenient loose practice in this introductory 
comment. Unfortunately, "confrontation" suggests a rather bellicose relationship. In 
using the term, I mean no more than to denote a situation wherein law and science 
must take each other into account. 
[1325] 
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present symposium may be related. The articles included in it will 
not, of course, be co-extensive with my list; neither, I should add, 
were the papers presented to the conference. 
This list does not include that arena of contact between law 
and science which is at once the most venerable and the most direct 
of them all: namely, that created by the patent laws. However, I 
believe today the most consequential points of confrontation which 
could be allocated to that arena may be more usefully distributed 
among various of the arenas of confrontation that I am listing below. 
To be sure, there may be social and economic trends undenvay 
which will alter materially the importance of the patent laws in 
this country, trends to which the antitrust laws and the great ex-
pansion in government-supported research may be contributing. 
However, it is still too early to forecast where, in the interaction of 
law and science, the effects of such trends are most likely to give rise 
to new confrontations. In presenting each of the arenas in my list, 
I shall note one or two examples of points of confrontation, present 
or prospective, and shall also call attention to the type of problem 
that appears to me most characteristic and consequential of those 
that lie within the arena. 
(I) Points at which the law, in discharging its traditional ad-
judicatory function, must draw on scientific knowledge to reach its 
decisions. Here we encounter the hostility which our adversary sys-
tem of civil and criminal procedure arouses in the expert witness. 
This reaction manifests itself in a wide gamut of cases but is prob-
ably most pronounced in damage suits for personal injuries and in 
criminal cases in which the defense of insanity is raised. In both 
types of case, there has been experimentation with the device of 
the court-appointed impartial witness,3 but I am doubtful that that 
remedy will be widely accepted. More progress may be made in re-
laxing the restraints which the law has long placed on the form of 
the expert's testimony. These confrontations in the adjudicatory 
process pose procedural problems; but they are sometimes inter-
twined with problems in the formulation of substantive standards, 
especially in the insanity defense cases. The questions cut deep, and 
the devising of satisfactory solutions will be neither easy nor soon 
completed. 
(2) Points at which scientific developments are compelling us 
to re-examine the adequacy of established legal doctrines. Despite 
the amazing ability of the common law to accommodate change in 
3. For a recent survey of these plans as developed for personal injury litigation, see 
Comment, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 523 (1964). 
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the activities on which its doctrines impinge, situations develop from 
time to time which strike at the premises of existing rules and prin-
ciples and thereby require legislative action in response. The develop-
ment of workmen's compensation laws and of zoning laws ex-
emplifies such major readjustments in the past. Looking to the future 
for developments that may require legislative action, one sees, as one 
example, the emergence of those electronic devices that are permit-
ting their users to invade the privacy of other people with little or 
no risk of detection.4 The varied legal defenses against invasion of 
privacy in the past have been predicated on the supposition that 
the invasions would be overt. If this is no longer to be true, some 
new point must be found at which an effective legal protection of 
privacy can be introduced. 
The technology of electronics is presenting us with another set 
of problems. The value of the computer program to persons other 
than the programmer and his employer raises questions as to the 
kind and degree of protection the law should afford this form 
of intellectual property.5 Moreover, a related problem will arise as 
increasingly the contents of libraries are reduced to machine-read-
able, readily reproducible forms. What protection should the copy-
right-holder be accorded with respect to this material? 
Both of these arenas of confrontation create problems of basic 
policy for which existing law has no pat answers. 
(3) Points at which scientific developments have created new 
hazards that have led the state to intervene, thereby creating new 
points of confrontation. Examples may be found in several amend-
ments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which have been enacted 
in the past decade or so. These have imposed on the Food and Drug 
Administration the responsibility of setting tolerances for chemicals 
in or on foods, drugs, and cosmetics and of approving new drugs for 
safety and effectiveness.6 The difficult judgments that must be 
4. The problem is discussed in DASH, SCHWARTZ 8: KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 
(1959); PACKARD, THE NAKED SocIETY (1964); King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitu-
tional Rights-Some. Recent Developments and Observations, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
240 (1964). 
5. The problem is discussed in Note, 64 CoLuM. L. REv. 1274 (1964); Note, 38 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 891 (1963). A symposium of four articles on the subject in the Bulletin 
of the Copyright Society, II BuLL. CR. Soc. 361 (1964), was prefaced by an announce-
ment from the Copyright Office that computer programs meeting certain conditions 
might be registered as "books." The announcement recognized that its action was 
subject to favorable resolution of two basic legal questions, both of which it character-
ized as "doubtful.'' 
6. See the following sections of the Food, Drug 8: Cosmetics Act: §§ 201(q), 408, 68 
Stat. 511 (1954), 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(q), 346(a) (1958) (authorizing regulations to establish 
tolerances for pesticide residues on raw foods); §§ 20l(d), 409, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958), 21 
U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 348 (to prescribe restrictions on the use of chemical additives in 
foods); §§ 20l(t), 706, 74 Stat. 399 (1960), 21 U.S.C. §§ 32l(t), 376 (Supp. V, 1964) (to 
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reached in the application of these provisions pose ultimately the 
problem that seems to me basic in this arena: in whose hands should 
the decision-making power rest: in the hands of scientists or of the 
administrator (often a lawyer)? Or should there be some combina-
tion of these different forms of expertise in the making of decisions? 
An example of such a combination is to be found in the procedure 
developed by statute and regulation for the licensing of power re-
actors by the Atomic Energy Commission.7 
(4) Points at which government, acting through the legal mech-
anisms of appropriation, executive order, and contract, must choose 
scientific objectives, ration scarce research resources, and seek to 
maximize the contributions of the scientific community. Here the 
lawyer is charged with establishing both a framework within which 
the government's scientific programs can be carried out and a set of 
controls, regulatory and contractual, to guide those programs in con-
formity to the government's policy objectives. Important in this 
arena, of course, are the government's policies concerning the patent 
rights and privileges of the parties contracting with it. There are 
many legal problems in shaping these and other aspects of the re-
lations between the government and the persons on whom it must 
rely for the execution of its programs. Underlying these problems, 
however, is a difficult problem of communication among three 
groups, the policy-makers in the Executive Branch, the Congress, 
and the scientific community. In aiding in the resolution of that 
problem, in serving as a mediator among these groups, and in help-
ing to work out viable compromises with due regard for their eco-
nomic and social as well as legal implications, the lawyer can make 
his most important contribution.8 
(5) Points at which government, acting through its power of 
taxation, is able to give or withhold encouragement to scientific and 
technological development. Here it is the federal government that 
is chiefly concerned, partly through the tax exemptions it accords to 
private foundations9 and partly through the favorable tax treatment 
it grants to patents and to expenditures for research and develop-
prescribe restrictions on the use of color additives in or on foods, drugs, and cosmetics); 
§§ 201(p), 505, 76 Stat. 781 (1962), 21 U.S.C. §§ 32l(p), 355 (Supp. V, 1964) (to provide 
for the approval of "new drugs" for safety and effectiveness). 
7. Atomic Energy Law of 1954, §§ 181-91, 68 Stat. 953, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2232-39 (1958), 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2232(b), 2239, 2240, 2241 (Supp. V, 1964). 
8. This concept of the lawyer's role is developed in Beresford, Lawyers, Science, and 
the Government, 33 GEO, WASH. L. REv. 181 (1964). 
9. The problems of preventing the exploitation for private purposes of charitable 
foundations (including those created to foster scientific research) are examined in 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, SENATE COMM, ON FINANCE, 
Comm. Print, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
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ment by private industry. The desirability of encouraging these 
activities must be appraised in the light of the objectives of the tax 
system as such. The basic problem here seems one of weighing and 
striking a proper balance between conflicting values. 
(6) Points at which scientific developments are bringing us 
into new contacts with our neighbors on the planet, thereby creating 
a need for new legal relationships. Recent years have provided a 
number of examples in this arena, among them the test ban treaty;10 
the efforts, as yet only partly successful, to demilitarize outer space;11 
the scheme of international cooperation for the exploration and 
study of Antarctica;12 and the global pattern of arrangements in the 
process of development for Comsat's communication system.13 The 
basic problem here is to meet the demand for creativity; fawyers and 
scientists in each participating country have to join with their fel-
lows in other countries in the design of, or adaptation to, new legal 
instrumentalities and relationships to advance and secure the com-
moi;i. interests of all nations. 
II 
Adopting, for the purposes of this introduction at least, the 
foregoing incomplete and essentially suggestive scheme of classifica-
tion, where within it do the contributions to the symposium fit? 
Plainly two of them, the article by Professors Diamond and Louisell 
and that by Dr. Bock, are concerned with problems that lie within 
the first of the arenas of confrontation which I have listed: the 
problems engendered in the adjudicatory process. Both articles bear 
directly on one of the law's least successful procedures in that 
process: the procedure for drawing on the expertise of the scientist 
and transmitting it effectively to the decision-maker, be it court or 
jury. 
Although among the three authors of these two articles are 
scientists from disciplines as disparate as psychiatry and economics, 
I think it significant that each of them manifests concern as to the 
10. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, signed at Moscow, August 5, 1963. For its text, see 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 1026 
(1963), T.I.A.S. No. 5433. 
11. See Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, Res. 1884 (A/5571), Res. 1962 
(A/5656), 58 AM. J. lNT'L L. 477 (1964). 
12. Antarctic Treaty, signed at Washington, Dec. I, 1959. For its text, see 54 AM. J. 
lNT'L L. 477 (1960), T.I.A.S. No. 4780. 
13. See Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial 
Communications Satellite System and Special Agreement (containing technical and 
financial arrangements to which communication entitles designated by signatory 
governments are also parties), Aug. 20, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 3 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 806, 810 (1964). The arrangements are discussed, and Soviet objections to 
them reported, in Simsarian, Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Com• 
munications Satellite System, 59 AM. J. lNT'L L. 344 (1965). 
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relationship of the experts in his field to the lawyer advocates with 
whom they are associated in litigation. Dr. Bernard L. Diamond 
is a psychoanalyst who is a Professor of Criminology and Law at the 
University of California at Berkeley, where he is a colleague of his 
co-author, Professor D. W. Louisell, whose field is Procedure. In 
their article, "The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Rumina-
tions and Speculations," they join in stressing the importance of a 
candid recognition in trial procedure that the psychiatrist's partisan-
ship is inseparable from his need to achieve a genuine understand-
ing of the defendant as a human being if he is to evaluate the de-
fendant's mental state for the purpose of the criminal law. 
In "The Relativity of Economic Evidence in Merger Cases," Dr. 
Betty Bock, an economist and manager of the Antitrust Department 
of the National Industrial Conference Board, views the problems 
of the economic expert in antitrust litigation against the broadening 
demands of the courts in merger cases for an evaluation of risks to 
competition, actual or potential, that may be laid at the door of the 
merger under attack. She emphasizes the importance that the econo-
mist, who must work closely with counsel in developing the case, 
preserve a degree of independence in the collaboration. Apparently, 
the danger for the expert in economics is not that he will have at-
tributed to himself in the courtroom a spurious, or at least artificial, 
objectivity, but rather that he will be converted by counsel into a 
specialized law clerk or a highly specialized pleader and thereby 
lose the ability to make a distinctive contribution to an understand-
ing of the problem at issue. 
Many of the procedural imp~diments against which Dr. Diamond 
and Professor Louisell direct their comments would be removed or 
mitigated if more state legislatures were to adopt the 1937 Model 
Expert Testimony Act,14 the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence,16 
or, for criminal cases, the 1962 Model Penal Code.16 Some little 
progress in this direction is apparent. In the interim, I think we 
can take encouragement from the authors' observation that more 
and more trial courts are freeing the defendant's psychiatric witness 
from old evidentiary restraints, thereby enabling him to testify 
more intelligibly. Although this indulgence has not been tested in 
the appellate courts, it suggests that the scientific advances in the 
14. 9A UL.A. 353 (1957). 
15. 9A U.L.A. 207 (Supp. 1964). 
16. The Code, sponsored by the American Law Institute, was influential in the 
drafting of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 and is likely to influence the draftsmen 
in the considerable number of states, including New York, in which revision of the 
criminal laws is in progress. 
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understanding of "mental disease or defect"17 are coming to be 
comprehended more widely in the courts. If so, one may expect that 
in time this will be reflected in legislation. 
Does the article, "Noise and the Law" by Mr. George A. Spater, 
which is directed specifically to the legal questions created by the 
impact of airport noise on neighboring householders, provide an 
example that might be brought within my second arena of con-
frontation? Has the noise-making capacity of the jet airplane reached 
such a point that it requires the re-examination of received doctrines, 
including doctrines limiting the responsibility for damage inflicted 
by governments and the private instrumentalities they authorize 
to serve the public? As I have already noted, one of the extraordinary 
achievements of our common-law system has been its adaptation to 
change, and this adaptability manifests itself also in our processes of 
constitutional interpretation. 
A reading of Mr. Spater's article leaves one with the impression 
that, in the view of the courts, the noise hazard of the airplane has 
not exceeded the limits of doctrinal absorption. Although as Gen-
eral Counsel of American Airlines, Mr. Spater is concerned with 
solutions to the practical problems that jet noise has created for the 
major airports, he approaches these problems in the lawyer's tradi-
tional fashion: by a close analysis and evaluation of case law, draw-
ing as readily on 19th Century precedent as on the most contempo-
rary. His ability to rely on received doctrine has been disturbed, 
however, by two recent cases he discusses in which the courts of 
Oregon and Washington (the latter in interpreting its atypical state 
constitution) have reached decisions that take a new look at the 
concept of a "taking" for which compensation is constitutionally 
required. If these are followed, the repercussions of the resulting 
change might prove so consequential as to induce far-reaching 
changes in the technology and operating practices of the air trans-
port industry. 
What do developments of the sort foreshadowed in these articles 
portend for law schools and legal education? Do the rise of science, 
both basic and applied, and the pervasiveness of its effects on our 
society carry with them not only a rise in the prestige of the scien-
tist's calling but also a corresponding diminution in the importance 
of the functions of law in American society and of the influential 
place in that society which the lawyer has long enjoyed? If such 
17. This phrase is used both in the Model Penal Code's provision § 401(1), dealing 
with criminal responsibility and in the much-discussed "Durham rule," adopted in 
the District of Columbia as a test for the defense of insanity. Durham v. United States, 
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
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a development seems at all possible, what should be its consequences 
for legal education; and how, if at all, have the law schools been 
adapting their curricula and instructional methods to cope with the 
new or impending developments? 
These are questions to which Professor George A. Frampton 
of the University of Illinois Law School addresses himself in his 
article on "Scientific Eclat and Technological Ohange: Some Im-
plications for Legal Education." Professor Frampton gives little 
reason to suppose that the important functions of the lawyer, the 
special fortes he contributes to the operation of our complex society, 
are in danger of falling into desuetude. On the contrary, he sees 
a growing need for the lawyer to exercise these fortes in meeting 
many of the new problems that .are now emerging. 
Turning to the law schools, Professor Frampton sees evidence 
of their response to technologically-induced social change in an 
array of second- and third-year courses and seminars that are new-
comers to law school catalogs. When these are added to the diverse 
activities of many law professors outside the classroom, he finds im-
pressive evidence of adaptation by law schools to new social needs. 
However, he finds these responses unevenly distributed among the 
law schools of the land, with progress being concentrated in a rela-
tively small number of the nation's schools. 
I believe readers of Professor Frampton's article will find in it, 
as I have found, more evidence of the law schools' responses to the 
results of technological change in terms of social change, national 
and international, than he will find evidence of law school efforts 
to study directly the processes whereby these results are brought 
about, to examine some of the specific ways in which scientific and 
technological developments actually affect, or are affected by, law, 
its institutions, and its processes. Much of the little instruction that 
may involve the latter is, I suspect, incidental to the pursuit of other 
ends. However, it is easy to underestimate the difficulty of the law 
schools' educational problem; the very diversity in points of con-
frontation that I noted at the start of this introductory comment 
makes it very hard to design places for their consideration within 
a crowded curriculum-except by resort to that ever-ready outlet 
for a faculty that is uneasy as to the coverage of its curriculum, the 
creation of a new seminar. Moreover, in the study of the interaction 
of law and science, another problem must also be reckoned with: 
student preparation-or the lack of it. 
Given the stage which legal instruction directed to this subject 
has thus far reached, I find it hard to decide whether the concern 
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as to the unevenness of the resources and offerings among the law 
schools that Professor Frampton expresses is directed to an issue 
of consequence. Certain subjects which are or will probably be con-
fined to a relatively small number of schools are likely in practice 
to remain the concern of only a limited number of lavryers. By and 
large, these la·wyers will be graduates of the schools with the widest 
range of curricular offerings, but not because of these offerings. How-
ever, if one takes a less practice-oriented view, this fact does not re-
lieve the law schools of their problem. Few lawyers have constitu-
tional cases and still fewer practice international law; yet, the law 
schools have recognized the importance of these subjects in training 
the future lawyer for his role as citizen and leader of citizens. Per-
haps the study of the interactions of law and science should be rec-
ognized as having a corresponding place in the training of to-
morrow's lawyers. If so, ways must be found to extend the reach of 
the curricular experimentation that is now confined to a relatively 
few law students in a relatively few law schools. 
One aspect of such a development which needs preliminary ex-
ploration is the question to what extent the law student needs in-
struction in the language of the computer. Within the past thirty 
years we have seen a few pioneering courses in Accounting for 
La·wyers expand until they are now a commonplace in law school 
curricula. This was done, not because the lawyer needed to be 
trained as an accountant, but because he needed to know the ac-
countant's language. For those who would like to test their capacity 
to follow what would doubtless be viewed by the initiate as a rather 
elementary discourse using computer calculations for the solution 
of a problem in prediction, the article, "Predicting Court Cases 
Quantitatively," by Assistant Professor Stuart S. Nagel, a lawyer who 
teaches political science at the University of Illinois, may prove 
revealing. 
The particular subject which Professor Nagel has chosen for his 
paper brings a scientific technique to the aid of the lawyer in a 
traditional professional task: predicting the outcome of future cases 
in the light of past cases. On the basis of a statistical study of the 
recurrence of certain factors in a sample of 149 civil liberties cases 
in the United States Supreme Court, Professor Nagel found that he 
could "postdict" the results of the cases in the sample with an accu-
racy of 'from seventy to seventy-four per cent, depending on the 
method used. This may be a useful tool for a social scientist investi-
gating the relative importance of different types of recurrent factors 
in the decision of related cases, but, for the lawyer seeking to predict 
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the result of a particular case in which he is engaged, its utility seems 
questionable. In that lawyer's case, as in any other, there will be 
variables present that a statistical system of forecasting cannot be 
expected to take into account. The lawyer may know on the basis of 
a conventional evaluation of the precedents that, absent the varia-
bles which are peculiar to his case, the odds are against success. But 
both he and the judges before whom he argues his case will have to 
evaluate those distinguishing characteristics of the case, and in this 
process the computer can scarcely be expected to help. 
Be that as it may, studies of the sort Professor Nagel reports 
might provide a form of exercise which the law teacher of the not 
distant future could use in introducing his students to the vocabu-
lary and syntax of computers. Too many processes in science, busi-
ness, and government are resorting to these extraordinary devices to 
allow the legal profession to remain illiterate in their tongues.18 
As one observes the law challenged in these and other ways by 
the need to meet exigencies created by new forces operating in and 
upon our society, the law may seem condemned to a chronic 
catching-up process. The law may seem always behind. But that 
is where law's place should be-except in rare instances as, for 
example, when the need arose to provide a legal framework to enable 
a private atomic industry to come into being. Ordinarily, it is the 
law's task to respond to, and to build on, social experience. A re-
sponse that is too hasty is likely to result in jerry-built law. When 
viewed in this perspective, the growth of the law has not been slow. 
Indeed, if one were to take as a bench-mark the law of 1900, I sus-
pect that the subsequent changes not merely in the law in books, but 
even more in the work of the lawyer, have not fallen far short of 
those occurring in most of our social institutions in the same period. 
By those changes, the law has been able to provide the necessary 
degree of stability in a society that science has been subjecting to 
extraordinary stress. 
18. Computers may be important in •the study of the work of the lower courts or in 
measuring responses to changes in legal rules, matters which involve the correlation of 
large bodies of data. Their potentialities for information retrieval as an aid to legal 
research have been the subject of much discussion. For a consideration of various 
techniques which are becoming available, see the Symposium on ]urimetrics, 28 LAW 8: 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 1 (1963). 
